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Honoring Margaret Berger
with a Sensible Idea
INSISTING THAT JUDGES EMPLOY A BALANCING
TEST BEFORE ADMITTING THE ACCUSED’S
CONVICTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 609(a)(2)
Aviva Orenstein†
INTRODUCTION
Impeachment of witnesses, though potentially edifying
for the jury,1 can create a host of problems that undermine the
fairness or accuracy of a trial. Certainly, the finder-of-fact
(judge or jury) must be made aware of potential deficits in a
witness’s credibility. The witness with poor eyesight who
reports what she saw, the witness who has made a deal with
the prosecutor, the witness with a reputation as a liar – all
need to be impeached to reveal possible problems with their
testimony. If the impeachment causes the jury to distrust the
witness more than warranted, however, or, worse, to dislike the
witness, valuable information may be inappropriately
discounted. This problem is most acute when the witness in
†

Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I want to
express my deep regard for Margaret Berger as a generous colleague, wonderful
teacher, and role model. I would like to thank Robin Ballard, Joshua Fix, Martha
Marion, and Judy Reckelhoff for excellent research help. Thanks also to Seth Lahn,
Hannah Buxbaum, Leandra Lederman, Sylvia Orenstein, William Popkin, Michael
Risinger, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Eileen Scallen, and David Szonyi for their insights, even
though and especially because they do not all agree with my conclusions. All mistakes
are my own.
1
I focus on jurors because they tend not to be repeat players in the justice
system and hence will have more difficulty with counterintuitive evidence principles.
Jurors are more susceptible to certain types of visceral reactions and unfair prejudice
than trained and experienced lawyers and judges, which is not to say that concerns
about bias and irrationality are limited to juries alone. Finally, because judges have to
rule on the admissibility of the evidence, the practical effect of exclusion (asking them
to forget inadmissible evidence) is more questionable than in the case of jurors who are
deprived of the evidence entirely.
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question is also the accused in a criminal case. Impeachment
that causes the jury to think of the accused as a bad person or
someone who should still be in jail for prior crimes undermines
the basic fairness of the trial.
This essay addresses a controversial form of
impeachment: the use of prior convictions to impeach a
witness’s character for truthfulness. It focuses on issues raised
when the witness is the accused because in that instance, the
rule is most interesting and its consequences most troubling.2
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), which was amended in
2006, any witness in a criminal or civil case may be impeached
by her criminal convictions.3 Rule 609 divides the type of prior
crimes with which a witness may be impeached into two
categories: (1) felonies, and (2) any crimes involving dishonesty
or false statement.4 Rule 609(a)(1) clearly provides a special
2

The “risk of unfair prejudice to a party in the use of [convictions] to
impeach the ordinary witness is so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.”
Proposed FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note, 51 F.R.D. 315, 392 (1971).
3
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
4
The following is the text of Rule 609 reflecting the 2006 amendments.
Crossed out material represents deletions; underlined material represents new
language.
609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
(a) General rule.
For the purpose of attacking the credibility character for truthfulness of a
witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused; and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the elements of
the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false
statement by the witness.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
Aspects of Rule 609(a) reflect major changes in the legal landscape over the
past three centuries. Until the late nineteenth century, people accused of crimes were
not permitted to testify at all under the party-witness rule. Our rule against selfincriminating is actually half of a larger rule that the accused in a criminal matter was
not allowed to testify either to incriminate or exculpate herself. Any rule for
impeaching witnesses, therefore, did not apply to the accused, who was barred from
taking the witness stand.
In a similar vein, historically, felons did not present impeachment
conundrums; under the old English law, felonies were punishable by death, so all but
those receiving pardons were unavailable to testify. Once some felonies became noncapital cases, the law had to decide what to do with convicted felons on the witness
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balancing test that the judge must apply before admitting
felonies to impeach a witness, with more stringent screening if
the witness is the accused. This essay proposes that, even for
convictions that involve dishonesty and false statement, the
judge must screen for unfair prejudice before allowing such
prior crimes to impeach the accused. In making this argument,
this essay stakes a position that opposes the current
interpretation of Rule 609 by federal courts, most state courts,
and academia. It presents not merely a policy critique of Rule
609(a)(2), which many might agree with, but advocates that
trial courts adopt a new interpretation and more limited
application of this rule. In addition, perhaps this essay will
persuade state legislatures to incorporate an explicit balancing
test into state versions of their Rules of Evidence.
I.

IMPEACHMENT OF THE ACCUSED WITH A PRIOR FELONY
CONVICTION

Understanding how Rule 609 treats impeachment with
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement requires that
one first look at how the Rule treats felony convictions.
Therefore, this essay first examines Rule 609(a)(1), which
admits evidence of a felony conviction by the accused only if the
probative value of the impeachment outweighs the prejudicial
effect to the accused.5 Although this sounds very similar to
Federal Rule of Evidence 403,6 which also employs language of
probative value and prejudice, the balancing test for the
accused imbedded in Rule 609(a) accomplishes something
different. Rule 403 is a balancing test applied by the judge as a
limited rule of exclusion, favoring admission of evidence; Rule
609, by contrast, is more restrictive. Further, under Rule
609(a)(1), the burden is on the prosecution to prove that such

stand. The trend in evidence has moved from treating felons as entirely incompetent to
testify to allowing them to testify with the impediment of disclosure of their prior
crimes. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1989) (“As the law
evolved, th[e] absolute bar gradually was replaced by a rule that allowed such
witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal cases, but also to be impeached by
evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen falsi misdemeanor conviction.”).
5
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
6
FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
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impeachment is more probative than prejudicial to the
accused.7
How exactly does a prior felony conviction impeach a
witness? Ostensibly, by hearing about a fairly recent prior
felony, the jury learns something about the character for
truthfulness of a witness.8 The theory is that someone who
would flout social norms by committing felonies might also be
more likely to lie; the same anti-social tendency that led to
felonious conduct could lead to perjury.9 At the best of times,
such an implication is weak.10
At the same time, information about the accused’s
previous felony has tremendous potential to make the trial
unfair to the accused who takes the stand. The jurors will likely
overvalue that information or otherwise misuse it. The mischief
caused by evidence of the accused’s convictions transcends the
mere imputation of criminality.
The harm is magnified if the prior crime being used to
impeach the testifying accused and the actual crime charged
are similar. The jury may jump to the wrong type of propensity
inference. Drawing an example from Rule 609(a)(1), imagine
that someone is charged with armed robbery and takes the
stand to deny her participation in the crime. She has a prior
7

See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 amendments
(“Although the rule does not forbid all use of convictions to impeach a defendant, it
requires that the government show that the probative value of convictions as
impeachment evidence outweighs their prejudicial effect.”). Also, all of Rule 609(a)
applies only to crimes that occurred less than ten years from the “date of the conviction
or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date.” FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
8
Rule 609 used to refer to credibility but was changed in 2006 to refer to
“character for truthfulness.” See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 2006
amendments.
9
This theory was articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who as a Justice on
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote in a civil case:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only
ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness
to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that
general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in
the particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no
tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured
himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition
that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.
Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
10
See generally Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence:
Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1991)
(arguing that impeachment for character for truthfulness or prior convictions should
never be allowed against a criminal defendant and explaining the limited probative
value of such impeachment where the accused is the witness).
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felony conviction, so the appropriate, if highly attenuated,
implication from her prior conviction is that it casts light on
her character for truthfulness. But what if the prior felony is
for armed robbery? Even (or especially) with a limiting
instruction,11 the jury is likely to gravitate to an impermissible
inference—that the accused tends to commit armed robbery.
This latter type of propensity evidence (as opposed to character
for truthfulness) is clearly banned by the Evidence Rules.12 It is
hard, however, to imagine how a jury could decline the
unspoken invitation to think of the accused as a violent
recidivist. Even if the evidence about the crime charged were
weak,13 the jurors may unconsciously soften the burden of proof;
they may be less scrupulous in weighing the evidence because
the accused deserves punishment for past wrongs. In addition,
they may wonder why the accused is at liberty if she has in the
past committed armed assaults, believing that the accused is
deserving of further punishment and preventive detention.
Given the low probative value of prior felony evidence,
the extreme prejudice to the accused, and the fact that
609(a)(1) includes a special balancing test whereby felony
convictions of the accused will be admissible only if the
probative value of the prior felony outweighs the prejudicial
effect to the accused,14 one might suppose that such evidence is
rarely admitted. In fact, however, admission under Rule
609(a)(1) is a major factor in criminal trials, and troubling
evidence exists that many accuseds do not take the stand
primarily to avoid triggering this form of impeachment.15 In
answering the common-sense (but devoid of the presumption of
11

See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
Rule 404(a) expressly excludes “evidence of a person’s character or trait of
character” in order to prove “action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”
FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Relatedly, Rule 404(b) provides: “Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
13
This might very well be so where the police may have first come to suspect
the accused because of her priors, and not because of any strong evidence linking her
directly to the crime charged.
14
Witnesses other than the accused will have their felony convictions
subjected to the more ubiquitous and permissive Rule 403 balancing test.
15
See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior
Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 491
(2008) (documenting that of the factually innocent accused in his data set who failed to
take the witness stand, 91% had prior convictions and “[i]n almost all instances . . .
counsel for the wrongfully convicted defendant indicated that avoiding impeachment
was the principal reason the defendant did not take the stand”); see also Jeffery Bellin,
Circumventing Congress: How The Federal Courts Opened The Door To Impeaching
Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 293 (2008).
12
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innocence) question why an innocent accused would not take
the witness stand in her own defense, one reason is that the
accused is afraid of the effects of being impeached by a prior
conviction.
As a functional matter, courts regularly misapply Rule
609(a)(1) by allowing prosecutors to impeach the accused with
felonies in ways that conflict directly with the letter, spirit, and
history of the Rule.16 In one subset of cases, however, admissionhappy courts tend to exercise caution and restraint. Courts
tend to take seriously the factor concerning the similarity
between the past conviction and the charged crime, and exclude
evidence of prior felonies to the extent that they resemble the
crime charged.17 Courts recognize that the chances of jury
confusion and unfair prejudice are particularly egregious in
such cases. Under the dominant interpretation of Rule
609(a)(2), however, courts currently have no opportunity to
consider this prejudice. The next Part presents Rule 609(a)(2)
and sets the stage for a discussion whether impeachment for
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule
609(a)(2) is subject to Rule 403 balancing.

16

Recently, Jeffrey Bellin criticized the federal courts’ “routine admission of
defendants’ prior convictions” under Rule 609(a)(1) as contravening congressional
intent. Bellin, supra note 15, at 293. Such a framework is the intellectual descendant of
the old, English common law tradition barring felons from testifying at all. See id. at
296-97 nn. 21, 23-24. Bellin outlined the “decidedly pro-impeachment,” five-factor
analytical framework that “places an almost insurmountable burden on defendants
attempting to exclude prior convictions.” Id. at 293.
17
See 28 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 6134 (1993) (“[T]he danger of prejudice is enhanced if the witness is the
accused and the crime was similar to the crime now charged, since this increases the
risk that the jury will draw an impermissible inference under Rule 404(a).”). See, e.g.,
United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985) (prior conviction for bank
robbery excluded as impeachment of accused in current bank robbery charge because
“there is a substantial risk that all exculpatory evidence will be overwhelmed by a
jury’s fixation on the human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible in
law: because he did it before, he must have done it again”); United States v. Joe, 07 Cr.
734 (JFK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55036, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008) (excluding
prior conviction because “the prior conviction for firearms possession is nearly identical
to the conduct charged in Count One, [thus] the jury may infer unfairly that Defendant
has a propensity to commit firearms offenses”); United States v. Jaramillo, No. 1:05CR-13, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38016, at *7-8 (D. Utah May 24, 2007) (accused’s prior
convictions for possession of controlled substances would not be admissible because
their probative value “would be outweighed by their prejudicial effect because the jury
may consider them to be evidence that he committed the possession crimes charged
rather than merely probative of his character for truthfulness”).
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II.

IMPEACHMENT FOR CRIMES INVOLVING DISHONESTY OR
FALSE STATEMENT

Rule 609(a)(2), last amended in 2006, provides that
“evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be
determined that establishing the elements of the crime
required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false
statement by the witness.”18 Historically, these types of crimes,
labeled by the common law as crimen falsi, were considered
particularly probative for impeachment purposes;19 because the
prior convictions actually have something to do with
dishonesty, the inference that they reflect on the character for
truthfulness of the accused seems reasonable.
Rule 609(a)(2), however, presents some interesting
variations: it makes no distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors; it does not differentiate the accused from other
witnesses; and, most importantly for this essay, it makes no
mention of any balancing test.
Although there is textual, historical, doctrinal, and
policy evidence for the proposition that Rule 609(a)(2) allows
for no balancing, this essay advocates that this orthodoxy be
reconsidered. It presents the arguments favoring the position
that Rule 609(a)(2) permits no balancing, and then offers
countervailing reasons that demonstrate why balancing is not
only permissible, but necessary.

18

FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
Scholars, rulemakers, and courts have disagreed about what types of
crimes fall into this special category regarding dishonesty and false statement, with
theft and receipt of stolen property being areas of contention. Compare United States v.
Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir. 2009) (appellate court refused to consider trial
court ruling “that because theft is an offense involving dishonesty under Tennessee
state law, the convictions could be used for impeachment purposes under Rule
609(a)(2)” where the defendant chose not to testify in light of the trial court’s ruling
and therefore waived his right to appeal the ruling), and U.S. Xpress Enters. v. J.B.
Hunt Transp., 320 F.3d 809, 816-17 (8th Cir. 2003) (trial court did not abuse discretion
in finding that receiving stolen property was a crime involving dishonesty within the
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2)), with United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir.
1982) (“Generally, crimes of violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth do not involve
‘dishonesty or false statement’ within the meaning of rule 609(a)(2).”), and United
States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We therefore hold that receipt of
stolen property is not per se a crime of dishonesty for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2), and
conclude that the district court erred in treating it as such.”).
The 2006 amendment was intended to “give effect to the legislative intent
to limit the convictions that are to be automatically admitted under subdivision (a)(2)”
to such cases where the act of falsity or dishonesty is obvious from the nature of the
crime charged. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
19
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III.

TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NO BALANCING

A.

A Plain Reading Analysis Indicates No Rule 403
Balancing

The text of Rule 609(a)(2) currently states that
convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statement by the
witness “shall” be admitted.20 They are not “admissible,” nor is
the word “may” used, but instead the imperative “shall” is
employed.21
Nowhere does the text of Rule 609(a)(2) call for any
balancing. Given the fact that other parts of Rule 609 include
three different balancing tests,22 it seems unlikely that
Congress’s failure to add a balancing test to Rule 609(a)(2) was
a mere inadvertent omission.23
Using another cannon of construction, one could argue
that Rule 403 is a general rule that must give way to the more
particular Rule 609. In United States v. Kiendra, the First
Circuit explained:
20

FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
“Shall” is inherently ambiguous—in that it can mean “must,” but also can
mean “should” or “will.” For that reason, in its recent restyling of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the word shall was excised entirely, and the proposed “restyled” Rule
609(a)(2) substitutes the word “must” for “shall.” See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA FOR COMMITTEE MEETING 136 (Oct. 23-24, 2008), available
at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2009/01-Jan/RestyleFRE501-706.pdf. It is fair to say
even before the proposed amendment that courts have read Rule’s 609(a)(2)’s “shall” as
an imperative. The switch to “must” for restyling purposes, even if it does go through,
is not fatal to the argument of this essay. The restyling of the rules cannot introduce
substantive changes, so if the argument that balancing is permissible and should be
encouraged is correct under the current rule, nothing should change with the restyling.
The template Committee Note to each of the restyled rules reads: “The language of
Rule [ ] has been amended as part of the restyling of the [ ] Rules to make them more
easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules.
These changes are intended to be stylistic only.” Memorandum from Robert L. Hinkle,
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3 (May 12, 2008), available at
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/07-July/ECRpt%20May%202008-1.pdf. To qualify
as a substantial change, a revision “changes the structure of a rule so as to alter the
way in which courts and litigants have thought about, and argued about, questions of
admissibility.” Id. at 2. The change to “must” confirms, however, that my proposed
reading of Rule 609(a)(2) is unorthodox.
22
The three tests are: (1) the special balance for the accused in Rule
609(a)(1); (2) Rule 403 balance for all other witnesses in Rule 609(a)(1); and (3) the
high hurdle for admission balance under 609(b) whereby the court may admit a stale
conviction only if the court determines, “in the interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
23
This is the expressio unius doctrine. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83 (1991).
21
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Rule 403 is a general provision intended to govern a wide landscape
of evidentiary concerns; Rule 609 is a narrow provision intended to
regulate the impeachment of witnesses who have been convicted of
prior crimes . . . “Specific terms prevail over the general in the same
or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.”24

Thus, it is argued that Rule 403 was not designed to override
the more specific Rule 609; rather it was “designed as a guide
for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have
been formulated.”25
B.

No Balance Is Necessary Because Crimes Under
609(a)(2) Are Particularly Probative

Historically, crimes involving false statement or
dishonesty best represent the policy underlying impeachment
for character for truthfulness.26 One might argue that balancing
is least necessary for these types of crimes because the
probative value of crimes involving false statement or
dishonesty is very high.27 Unlike garden-variety felonies, which
merely show the witness’s anti-social tendencies, convictions
contemplated by 609(a)(2) demonstrate that the accused is
willing to lie and deceive. Additionally, advocates of employing
Rule 609(a)(2) without any balancing test note that the recent
amendment further narrowed the scope of this Rule, limiting it
to the types of convictions in which falsity and dishonesty
would be readily apparent from the elements of the crime.
Hence, it is argued, such cases are increasingly few and more
tailored to the core concern of Rule 609—imputing character
for untruthfulness.

24

United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).
25
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note); see also Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000); FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee’s note.
26
In the original debates over Rule 609, the United States House of
Representatives advocated a version of the Rule that limited such impeachment to
convictions involving proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement. See
Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1984) (reviewing the legislative history of
Rule 609) (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 2381).
27
Cf. Emerald Ref., Inc. v. Kandiliotis, No. 93-1442, 1994 WL 71301, at *1
(E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994) (“Admissibility of past crimes of dishonesty for impeachment go
to the issue of the seriousness with which the witness takes the oath.”).

1300

C.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

The Legislative History Indicates that the Drafters of
Rule 609(a)(2) Never Anticipated Balancing

Rule 609 was hotly debated in Congress. An earlier
draft of Rule 609 included subsection 609(a)(3), which would
have allowed the court to exclude any type of conviction if the
probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.28 This subsection was severely criticized and apparently
rejected.29 Another school of thought advocated no balancing
whatsoever for any prior crimes.30 Therefore, those who believe
there is no balancing under Rule 609(a)(2) argue that the Rule
represents a purposeful decision not to engage in such
balancing.
Those who insist on applying Rule 609 without a
balancing test point out that the Rule was “the product of
extensive Congressional attention and considerable legislative
compromise, clearly reflecting a decision that judges were to
have no discretion to exclude crimen falsi.”31 After an extensive
review of the legislative history, the Court in United States v.
Wong concluded that Rule 609(a)(2) “unambiguously
demonstrates that a judge has no authority to prohibit the
government’s effort to impeach the credibility of a witness by
questions concerning a prior crimen falsi conviction.”32
This view is supported by the Conference Report on
Rule 609, which explained:
The admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty and false
statement is not within the discretion of the Court. Such convictions
are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are
always to be admitted. Thus, judicial discretion granted with respect

28

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971). Subsection (a)(3) was described as a
particularized application of Rule 403. Id. at 393.
29
117 CONG. REC. 29, 894-95 (1971). When the Supreme Court officially
promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence and transmitted them to the Congress,
section 609(a)(3) had disappeared. See United States v. Wong, 703 F2d. 65, 67 (3d Cir.
1983).
30
See Diggs, 741 F.2d at 579 (reviewing legislative history).
31
Id. at 581 (quoting United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 355 (1st Cir.
1981)); United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Toney, 615
F.2d 277, 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Congress thoroughly considered the pros and cons
of the mandatory admissibility of limited types of prior crimes evidence and
determined that in certain cases it was to be the rule. Rule 403 simply has no
application where impeachment is sought through a crimen falsi.”).
32
703 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1983).
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to the admissibility of other prior convictions is not applicable to
those involving dishonest or false statement.33

D.

Courts Are Unanimous in Ruling that Rule 609(a)(2)
Allows for No Balancing

In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., the Supreme
Court observed of Rule 609(a), in dicta: “With regard to subpart
(2), which governs impeachment by crimen falsi convictions, it
is widely agreed that this imperative, coupled with the absence
of any balancing language, bars exercise of judicial discretion
pursuant to Rule 403.”34 All circuits have also come to this same
conclusion,35 though they debate the parameters of the rule.36
33

H.R. REP. No. 1597, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7102.
Similarly, the original advisory committee’s note explained that the “admission of prior
convictions involving dishonesty and false statement is not within the discretion of the
court. Such convictions are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are
always to be admitted.” FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note.
34
490 U.S. 504, 525-26 (1989), superseded on other grounds by 1990
amendment to FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
35
See, e.g., SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have
plainly held that district courts do not have discretion to exclude prior convictions
involving dishonesty or false statements.”); United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606,
615-16 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[C]rimes involving ‘dishonesty or false statement,’ whether
felonies or misdemeanors, must be admitted under Rule 609(a)(2) as being per se
probative of credibility.”); Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 333 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the
prior conviction involved dishonesty or false statements, the conviction is automatically
admissible insofar as the district court is without discretion to weigh the prejudicial
effect of the proffered evidence against its probative value.”) (internal citation omitted);
United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied Kelly v. United States,
552 U.S. 1329 (2008) (“A trial judge has no discretion to exclude evidence that qualifies
under this rule (609(a)(2)).”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Harper, 527
F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Crimes qualifying for admission under Rule 609 (a)(2) are
not subject to Rule 403 balancing and must be admitted.”); United States v. Morrow,
977 F.2d 222, 228 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“Rule 609(a)(2) . . . clearly limits the
discretion of the court by mandating the admission of crimes involving dishonesty or
false statements.”); Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 609(a)(2)
. . . does not incorporate Rule 403.”); United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695 (8th Cir.
2008) (“Evidence of a conviction requiring proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or
false statement is automatically admissible and not subject to Rule 403 balancing by
the court.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Harris, 738 F.2d 1068, 1073
(9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]rimes involving dishonesty and fraud are automatically admissible
for impeachment purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).”) (internal citations omitted);
United States v. Begay, 144 F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 403 balancing
applies unless the prior crime involves dishonesty or false statements.”). Although I
could find no current case in the Eleventh Circuit, a Fifth Circuit case before the circuit
split would seem to apply. See United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir.
1981) (“[B]ribery is a crimen falsi in that it involves dishonesty. Hence, it is
automatically admissible.”) (internal citation omitted).
36
There were certainly debates in the common law surrounding Rule
609(a)(2), but they concerned the scope of crimen falsi. Historically, some courts
extended Rule 609(a)(2) to crimes such as drug use or robbery, crimes in which the
aspect of false statement or dishonesty was highly questionable. Even before the 2006
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The treatise writers also agree.37 This unanimity was not
always the case under the prior common law,38 and a number of
courts considered the question open during the late 1970s.39
Before the codification of the evidence rules, the common law,
while favoring the use of impeachment for crimes of dishonesty
and false statement, did not deprive judges of discretion to
disallow such evidence.40
E.

The Fact of Recent Amendment Indicates that Judicial
Interpretations of Rule 609(a)(2) Were Acceptable

The Federal Rules of Evidence are an odd hybrid of
statutes passed by Congress, and rules and amendments
promulgated via the Rules Enabling Act process.41 In 2006, Rule
609 was amended via the rulemaking process, and included
important changes to Rule 609(a)(2), yet nothing was altered
concerning the apparent absence of balancing. Given the
unanimous judicial authority indicating no balancing for Rule
609(a)(2), this would seem like an endorsement of those judicial
amendment, the modern trend had been to limit the types of crimes admissible under
this rule, precisely because there was perceived to be no opportunity for balancing. See,
e.g., United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that receipt
of stolen property is not per se a crime of dishonesty); cf. Cree v. Hatcher, 969 F.2d 34,
37 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Because the district court lacks the discretion to engage in
balancing, 609(a)(2) must be interpreted narrowly to apply to only those crimes that, in
the words of the Conference Committee, bear on a witness’s propensity to testify
truthfully.”). The 2006 amendment limits the types of crimes even further. Courts also
debate the level of detail that could be presented about the conviction. United States v.
Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1036 n.14 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that convictions admitted for
impeachment may not include collateral details). Cf. Commerce Funding v.
Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., 01 Civ. 3796, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902, at *2627 (May 2, 2005) (in a civil case, admitting prior crime under 609(a)(2) but limiting the
underlying facts using Rule 403).
37
See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 17, at § 6135 (“[S]ubdivision (a)(2) neither
requires nor permits balancing under Rule 403 or any other test.”); see also infra note
78.
38
See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tuttle, J.,
dissenting); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (allowing
balancing for all prior convictions of the accused).
39
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 358 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
see also Daniel R. Swetnam, Comment, The Interaction of Rules 609(a)(2) and 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Can Evidence of A Prior Conviction which Falls within
the Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) be Excluded by Rule 403?, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 380 (1981)
(arguing that Rule 403 balancing does apply).
40
See, e.g., Gordon, 383 F.2d at 939-40 (setting out criteria for the admission
of prior crimes, but applying no absolute rules concerning crimes of dishonest or false
statement).
41
Congress rejected the Evidence Rules as promulgated in 1975 and instead
codified its own version as statutes. Other amendments have been made as statutory
additions to the Evidence Rules. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
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interpretations, albeit by a body different from the original
legislature that enacted Rule 609.42
IV.

WHY THERE MUST BE SOME BALANCING IN APPLYING
RULE 609(a)(2)

Given the consensus among judges and academics
supported by a plain reading of the text, dicta from the United
States Supreme Court, and the Conference Report on Rule 609
that Rule 609(a)(2) does not allow balancing, what is the
justification for the contrary view? The counter-arguments
reflect concerns for basic fairness and the structural integrity
of the administration of evidence rules. Although subjecting
Rule 609(a)(2) to Rule 403 balancing is not the most natural
interpretation of the plain meaning, it is a reasonable one that
must be preferred to guarantee due process.
A.

Without Balancing, There Is Potential for Intolerable
Unfairness to the Accused

Although one could aptly criticize courts’ balancing for
felony convictions under 609(a)(1), courts do tend to follow one
protective principle: the exclusion of prior felony convictions
where the accused is charged with a similar crime.43 By
contrast, under the current interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2), no
such consideration, no matter how extreme the potential
prejudice, is entertained.
Where the crime charged and the prior conviction are
the same, the prejudice is overwhelming. For instance, in
United States v. Wilson,44 the accused was charged with
conspiring to defraud the United States government of tax
revenue and was impeached with his prior conviction for
failure to file tax returns. No Rule 403 balancing test was

42

Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000)
(“Congress’ tobacco-specific legislation has effectively ratified the FDA’s previous
position that it lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco.”).
43
See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.05[3][d] (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) (“When a prior crime committed by the
accused is similar to the one with which the accused is charged, the prejudicial effect of
a prior conviction admitted for impeachment may well outweigh its probative value.
Consequently, prior convictions for the same or similar crimes are admitted
sparingly.”).
44
985 F.2d 348, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1993).
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allowed or conducted.45 The permitted chain of inference, that
since the accused evaded taxes before, he is probably a liar who
is not telling the truth about evading taxes now, is
preposterously obscure and ultimately toxic. Realistically, such
impeachment invited the jury to think of the accused as a
recidivistic tax dodger.46 Other cases, such as a bank fraud case
where the accused’s prior conviction for bank larceny was
admitted,47 mail fraud where the accused’s prior mail fraud was
admitted,48 and counterfeiting where the accused’s prior
conviction for counterfeiting was admitted,49 similarly fit this
template. In none of these, however, did the court apply a Rule
403 balancing test.
The potential for extreme unfairness stems from two
factors: (1) the effect on the jury; and (2) the consequent
strategic decision, which many of the accuseds will make, not
to testify at all. The presumption of innocence is a hard
principle to effectuate even under the best of circumstances.
The jurors already will have a tough time remembering that
the person sitting at the defense table, whom the police have
arrested and the government is prosecuting, must be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. This presumption becomes
much more difficult when the jurors learn that the accused has
a criminal past and, in fact, a record for doing the exact same
thing. The jurors will label the accused as a criminal with a
specialty crime, and not limit their skepticism to just the
question of the accused’s character for truthfulness.50
45

Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
This is also the fact pattern in United States v. Tanaka, 204 Fed. Appx.
705, 706 (9th Cir. 2006). The accused was charged with convictions for structuring
transactions to evade currency reporting requirements and willful failure to file a tax
return. The court admitted his prior tax conviction under Rule 609(a)(2). The court
explained: “Failure to file a tax return is a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement, and crimes involving dishonesty are automatically admissible for
impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), and no balancing of
prejudice is required.” Id.
47
United States v. Carroll, 663 F. Supp. 210, 211-12, 214 (D. Md. 1986).
48
United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (7th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Congress meant what it said
in rule 609(a)(2) that the fact of a prior conviction for an offense such as mail fraud is
always admissible for impeachment purposes.”).
49
United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (forgery conviction admitted in
counterfeiting case).
50
Limiting instructions will not solve the problem. A limiting instruction
would theoretically focus the jury on the appropriate inference of character for
truthfulness. The following is typical: “Th[e] [defendant’s] earlier conviction was
brought to your attention only as one way of helping you decide how believable his
46
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Furthermore, the jury may soften the standard of proof.
Once jurors hear that the accused has been convicted of forgery,
mail fraud, or tax evasion in the past, the jurors’ concern about
making a mistake declines significantly. Even if the accused did
not commit the crime this time, it is not as if she is without
blame for some similar activity in the past, so an erroneous
conviction would not be a tragedy of an innocent person falsely
convicted. Finally, if the prior conviction reflects conduct more
heinous than the charged crime, the jury could be distracted or
seek to punish the accused further.
This line of thinking is thoroughly predictable;
therefore, the accused must consider the nature of the
impeachment she will experience if she takes the stand in her
own defense. If the judge has no power to exclude the accused’s
prior crime involving dishonesty or false statement, no matter
how prejudicial, the accused may simply decline to exercise her
right to testify and avoid impeachment altogether. Thus, the
accused is presented with an impossible dilemma. If she
testifies, the jury will form negative assessments of her
criminality generally and her propensity to commit certain
crimes. On the other hand, failure to take the stand also
presents a huge, unfair burden on the accused because jurors
tend to believe that criminal defendants who do not testify are
more likely to be guilty.51
testimony was. You cannot use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that he is
guilty of the crime that he is on trial for now.” O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, 1A FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 15.08 (5th ed. 2007) (listing this instruction from
Sixth Circuit and providing other examples by Circuit) (cited in Bellin, supra note 15,
at 300 n.37). Scholars have long noted the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions; in
fact, such instructions tend to draw attention to the evidence and may inadvertently
increase the unfairness of its use. Joel Lieberman, Understanding the Limits of
Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures to
Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L., 677, 677-86, (2000) (empirical research has demonstrated
that judicial admonitions to ignore evidence are relatively ineffective and sometimes
produce a backfire effect, resulting in jurors being more likely to rely on inadmissible
information after they have been specifically instructed to disregard it); J. Alexander
Tanford, Thinking About Elephants: Admonitions, Empirical Research and Legal
Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645, 651 (1992) (discussing the psychological futility of
limiting instructions).
51
See David Shaffer & Thomas Case, On the Decision to Testify in One’s Own
Behalf: Effects of Withheld Evidence, Defendant’s Sexual Preferences, and Juror
Dogmatism on Juridic Decisions, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 335 (1982)
(indicating that defendants who invoked the Fifth Amendment (either on the stand or
by declining to take the stand) were judged more likely to be guilty and more deserving
of conviction than their counterparts who took the stand and answered all questions.
“It appears as if many of our subject-jurors chose to disregard that judge’s instructions
and act on an impression that an innocent person who had nothing to hide would
surely not resort to such legal chicanery as a Fifth Amendment plea.”).
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Although the accused often faces the dilemma of
whether to testify and be impeached with a former crime or to
forgo the opportunity to testify altogether, that decision, when
it involves felonies under 609(a)(1), is made in light of a judge’s
belief that the prior conviction was more probative than
prejudicial. Without introducing Rule 403 as a judicial
screening device, prior crimes that are highly prejudicial would
be admitted with no such check. This is a loss not only for the
accused, but also for the whole justice system because the
criminal defendant likely has valuable information that will
increase trial accuracy.52
B.

The Probative Value of Any Prior Conviction Is
Diminished in the Case of the Accused

Assuming, arguendo, that prior convictions for
dishonesty or false statement are generally probative of a
witness’s character for truthfulness, the probative value of such
impeachment declines significantly when the witness is the
accused.53 Jurors are probably already skeptical of the
testimony of a defendant who claims that she did not commit
the charged crime. It is natural to suppose that the accused
might lie about her conduct to avoid punishment.54 Therefore,
the added information that the accused actually has committed
a prior crime of dishonesty or false statement adds significant
52

See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1327, 1328-29 (2009) (proposing changes in evidence law to encourage the accused to
take the witness stand).
53
Theoretically, it is possible to believe an accused’s denials slightly less
when one hears that the accused who denied moving survey markers on federal land
committed perjury in the past, United States v. Caudle, 48 F.3d 433, 435 (9th Cir.
1995), or the accused who is on trial for bank fraud was convicted of tampering with an
odometer. United States v. Harris, 512 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-78 (D. Conn. 1981).
54
See Friedman, supra note 10 at 638, 659 (arguing that prior bad acts of the
accused are “almost certain to yield no significant new information about his
truthtelling inclination in the specific case” because “a rational jury usually will
conclude, even without character impeachment, that the accused has a strong interest
in lying and little compunction against doing so. Character impeachment evidence is
overkill”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A
Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 408 (1980) (“Greater
incentive to deceive can hardly be imagined [than a defendant’s interest in acquittal]
and this motive and propensity are well understood and recognized by each member of
the jury.”) (quoted in Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 289, 289 n.32 (2008)); Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, supra
note 52, at 1367 (“[I]n every criminal case, a defendant’s interest in the outcome is
obvious, therefore lessening the need for other impeachment evidence.”) (citing 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 39, at 173 (Kenneth S. Brown ed., 6th ed. 2006)).
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prejudice without adding any additional probative value or
promoting a more informed verdict.55
C.

From a Linguistic Perspective, Rule 609(a)(2) Could Be
Read as Subject to Rule 403

Although Rule 609(a)(2) says that crimes of falsity and
dishonesty “shall be admitted,” it is nevertheless still possible
to read that form of impeachment as being subject to the
pervasive balance of Rule 403. Even with the transition to
“must” in the restyled rules,56 one could argue that it must be
admitted subject to Rule 403. To read Rule 609(a)(2) as outside
the reach of Rule 403 would mean that it is an evidence rule in
a category all its own, the only one entirely insulated from
judicial intervention on basic fairness grounds. Given that
unusual status, the presumption should be that all rules are
subject to Rule 403 unless the balance is affirmatively rejected
or another balance is proposed in its place. “Although one must
be somewhat of an interpretative funambulist to walk between
the conflicting demands of these Rules in order to arrive at a
resolution,”57 this is a credible, if strained reading that will
effectuate vital evidence policy and address the due process
concerns raised below.58

55

Some states that otherwise have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as
their own deviate from the template of Rule 609. Examples include: Arizona, ARIZ. R.
EVID. 609(a) (which applies the same test to felonies and crimes involving dishonesty or
false statement); Tennessee, TENN. R. EVID. 609(a)(3) (“If the witness to be impeached
is the accused in a criminal prosecution . . . the court upon request must determine
that the conviction’s probative value on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial
effect on the substantive issues.”); and Hawaii, HAW. R. EVID. 609(a) (limiting all
impeachment to convictions involving dishonesty and false statements, but only
allowing such impeachment against the accused when the accused has first presented
evidence supporting her credibility). Montana allows no impeachment by conviction at
all. MONT. R. EVID. 609.
56
See supra note 21.
57
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 194 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
58
The Supreme Court of Iowa has taken this policy a step further, and
requires more stringent 609(a)(1) balancing of 609(a)(2) convictions, despite the fact
that Iowa’s rules of evidence read identically to the pre-2006 federal rules for the
purposes of Rule 609(a). See State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1997) (“Iowa
rule of evidence 609, subsection 609(a)(2) provides concerning impeachment that
‘evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved
dishonesty or false statement . . . .’ The trial court also must determine ‘that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused.’”).
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There is Precedent in the Evidence Rules for
Acknowledging the Potential Due Process Problems with
Similar Act Character Evidence of the Accused and for
Applying Rule 403 Despite the Absolutist Language

A more recent debate about the applicability of Rule 403
to another set of Evidence Rules offers insight into how Rule
609(a)(2) should be interpreted. Federal Rules of Evidence 413414, enacted by statute in 1995, have been subject to Rule 403
balancing even though Rule 403 is not mentioned in those
Rules. The language of Rule 413 commands that “[i]n a
criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of
sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.”59 Arguably, the language “is admissible” represents
an unmodified command to admit the evidence, prohibiting
judges from exercising their discretion to balance between
probative value and unfair prejudice. However, every court
that has considered the question has held that Rule 403
applies.60
Admittedly, Rules 413-414 do not present a perfect
analogy. The phrase “is admissible” is less absolute than the
command of Rule 609(a)(2) “shall be admitted.”61 At least part
of the legislative history of Rules 413-414 anticipated the use of
Rule 403 balancing, even though Rule 403 itself is not
mentioned in the text of Rules 413-414.62 And, no variation of
59

FED. R. EVID. 413. The language of Rule 414 is identical, except that Rule
413 is for sex; Rule 414 is for child molestation. FED. R. EVID. 414. The restyled rules,
perhaps in light of the jurisprudence surrounding Rules 413-414 read: the court may
admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault.
60
See Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1517-19 (2005) (noting the
courts’ holdings that Rule 403 applies but expressing concern that courts do no apply
the balancing test in a meaningful fashion, but instead engage in Rule “403-lite”).
61
See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1997).
62
Then representative Kyl explicitly noted that “[t]he trial court retains the
total discretion to include or exclude this type of evidence.” 140 CONG. REC. H5437-03,
H5438 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (quoted in United States v.
Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Sumner, 119
F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting a statement by Rep. Molinari: “In other respects,
the general standards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, including . . . the
court’s authority under Evidence Rule 403 to exclude evidence whose probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Floor Statement of the Principal
House Sponsor, Representative Susan Molinari, Concerning the Prior Crimes Rules for
Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 103 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug.
21, 1994)). Others were not so sure. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS
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Rule 403 appears in other sections of Rules 413-414, as occurs
with Rule 609. Nevertheless, courts unanimously read Rule
403 into the text of Rules where it seemingly does not apply,
and do so for reasons of basic fairness. As the Tenth Circuit
explained in United States v. Enjady,63 the adoption of Rules
413-414 “without any exclusion of or amendment to Rule 403
makes Rule 403 applicable, as it is to others of the rules of
evidence.”64 There is no exclusion of Rule 403 in the text of Rule
609(a)(2), and the principle applies equally to it.
The courts that wrestled with Rules 413-414 made clear
that their application of Rule 403 was rooted in due process
considerations. Criminal defendants opposing the new rules
argued persuasively that the highly prejudicial evidence of
prior sex crimes violated fundamental fairness. The courts
acknowledged a serious problem, but noted that the Supreme
Court had left open whether violations of historical character
evidence protections constituted a due process violation, and
were not necessarily convinced that the unfairness fell within
the limited category of infractions that violate fundamental
fairness. However, even the courts that acknowledged a due
process problem were satisfied that the discretionary power of
the judge under Rule 403 addressed any due process concerns.
These cases clarified that Rule 403 served as a guarantor of
due process.65
The potential prejudice in 609(a)(2) cases where the
prior conviction is similar to the crime charged is equally
extreme and undermines the basic fairness of the trial. The
remedy, application of Rule 403, should be the same.
E.

Respect for the District Court’s Function Mandates that
Judges Retain the Authority to Engage in Some
Balancing, Even Regarding Convictions Involving
Dishonesty or Falsehood

Oftentimes, a conviction for falsity or dishonesty will
seem probative, maybe even highly probative, of the accused’s
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN
MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 56 CRIM. L. REP 2139 (recommending
rejecting of the rules in part because applicability of Rule 403 was uncertain).
63
134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998).
64
Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
65
See, e.g., United States v. Catstillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“[A]pplication of Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence eliminates the due process concerns
posed by Rule 414.”); see generally supra note 60, at 1517-18.
OF THE
SEXUAL
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credibility; but that does not mean the consideration is over.
The trial court must have the discretion to examine the other
side of the Rule 403 balance—the nature and extent of unfair
prejudice. Traditionally, the district court judge serves a vital
role as evidence screener. The trial court is in the best position
to make the context and fact-driven determination of how
probative versus how prejudicial the prior conviction will be. As
argued above, requiring the admission of prior convictions and
disallowing any judicial oversight is unfair to the accused. In
addition, it strips the trial court of a major judicial function.
This concern with the judge’s role was the basis of
Judge Tuttle’s dissent in United States v. Toney,66 which
explained that, “the purpose of rule 403 was to provide judges
some flexibility in cases where the possibility of prejudice is
extremely great.”67 In analyzing the facts of the case Judge
Tuttle observed:
It would be hard to imagine evidence more prejudicial, in a trial for
mail fraud, then [sic] the defendant’s prior conviction for mail fraud.
I would suggest that the probative value of a conviction involving
dishonesty is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant, when the prior conviction concerns the
same kind of offense as that for which the defendant is being tried.68

He therefore concluded that “[a] judge should not be prohibited
from excluding this evidence by a rigid holding that rule 403
can never be applied to rule 609(a)(2).”69
Allowing a Rule 403 balance reflects the natural
function of the trial judge who will probably be holding various
hearings to rule on evidence anyway. It requires no special
extra administrative energy, but reinforces the quintessential
role of the judge as screener and gatekeeper. As the Supreme
Court explained in United States v. Abel,70 “[a] district court is
accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of
evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the probative
value of [the proffered evidence], and weighing any factors
counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district
court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403. . . .”71 That
discretion is central to and inherent in the judicial role, and it
66
67
68
69
70
71

615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
Id. at 283.
Id. at 283-84.
Id.
469 U.S. 45 (1984).
Id. at 54.
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appears in many aspects of the judge’s labors.72 The judicial
duty to secure a fair trial devoid of substantial and
unnecessary unfair prejudice can be fulfilled with a creative
reading of Rule 609(a)(2).
V.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EXTENT OF IMPEACHMENT
UNDER RULE 609(a)(2)

For reasons of fairness, respect for the structure of the
rules, and the power of the judge, Rule 403 balancing must
apply to Rule 609(a)(2). If this argument buckles under the
weight of the authority opposed to it, however, the very least
trial judges can do is limit the way the impeachment is proved.
If, indeed, a judge must allow the prosecutor to impeach an
accused charged with a prior conviction for wire fraud, then
perhaps the damage can be limited by prohibiting the
admission of the specific nature of the prior crime. The jury
could be informed that the accused had been convicted of a
crime involving dishonesty, but not exactly what that crime
was. Some states have done just that, allowing the fact of a
prior conviction, but not the details of the prior crime.73
72

There is a long tradition of the judge as gatekeeper. Judges perform that
role in screening expert testimony. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[N]either the difficulty of the task nor any comparative
lack of expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the ‘gatekeeper’ duties that the
Federal Rules . . . impose—determining, for example, whether particular expert
testimony is reliable and ‘will assist the trier of fact,’ Fed. Rule Evid. 702, or whether
the ‘probative value’ of testimony is substantially outweighed by risks of prejudice,
confusion or waste of time, Fed. Rule Evid. 403.”). Even where the rules of evidence do
not apply, the judge retains a gatekeeper role. Judges act as gatekeepers under the
Federal Death Penalty Act. See United States v. Pepin, 514 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir.
2008) (“[U]nder the FDPA [s]tandard, judges continue their role as evidentiary
gatekeepers and, pursuant to the balancing test set forth in § 3593(c), retain the
discretion to exclude any type of unreliable or prejudicial evidence that might render a
trial fundamentally unfair.”); United States v. Roman, 371 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43 (D.P.R.
2005) (“Although capital sentencing proceedings are released from the strictures of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), the trial judge retains his
traditional role as gatekeeper of constitutionally permissible information, and must
accordingly exclude any unreliable or prejudicial information that might render a trial
fundamentally unfair.”).
73
See State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 16 (1984) (“The defendant’s character,
from which the jury might draw an inference of dishonesty, would thus be sufficiently
impugned without the extraordinary prejudice that sometimes follows when the prior
crime is specifically named.”); State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 230 (1971) (requiring
balancing by the judge to admit the specific nature of the prior conviction); cf. State v.
Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 391 (1993) (limiting evidence of conviction to “the degree of the
crime and the date of the offense but excluding any evidence of the specific crime of
which defendant was convicted”); State v. White, 43 Wash. App. 580, 586 (Ct. App.
1986) (citing State v. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 121 (1984)) (placing the decision
whether to allow specifics about the prior crime in the hands of the district court). But
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From where would the judge, bound by the current text
of 609(a)(2), derive authority to follow these state courts’ lead?
If the answer is Rule 403,74 we would seemingly be right back
where we started, and this proposal could not serve as a nextbest method to avoid the intolerable unfairness of impeaching
the accused with evidence of a similar prior crime. However, it
cannot be true that no part of Rule 403 applies to admission of
impeachment for a prior crime of dishonesty. Certainly, the
prosecutor cannot, in the course of proving a prior conviction
involving dishonesty or false statement, make outrageous
comments about “bloodsucking hucksters who prey on the
elderly” or call weepy victims to prove the prior fraud. Such
tactics would be prohibited even if the specific nature of the
crime is admissible. Hence, some residual power vested in the
court under Rule 403 and Rule 611,75 which controls the order
and mode of proof, support the inherent ability of the trial
court judge to manage the evidence. Limiting the prior
conviction for an act of dishonesty to the fact of such conviction,
without naming or describing the exact crime, would mitigate
the immense prejudice against the accused. In addition, this

see People v. Van Dorsten, 298 N.W.2d 421, 421 (Mich. 1980) (“It is improper to
impeach defendant by telling jury only of existence of unnamed prior felony
convictions, without providing names of the offenses, since it is the nature, rather than
the fact, of prior felony conviction which jury is to use in its evaluation of credibility.”).
74
State v. White, 43 Wash. App. 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing State v.
Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 121 (1984)) (“[T]he determination of whether to name or not
name the prior convictions introduced for the purposes of impeachment should rest
with the discretion of the trial judge as an additional aspect of the ultimate
determination that the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the defendant does not
outweigh its probative value.”).
75
Rule 611, entitled “Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation” in
section (a) provides: “The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.” The advisory committee note explains:
[Rule 611] restates in broad terms the power and obligation of the judge as
developed under common law principles. It covers such concerns as whether
testimony shall be in the form of a free narrative or responses to specific
questions, the order of calling witnesses and presenting evidence, the use of
demonstrative evidence, and the many other questions arising during the
course of a trial which can be solved only by the judge’s common sense and
fairness in view of the particular circumstances.
FED. R. EVID. 611 advisory committee’s note (citations omitted).
Cf. 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 611.03[4](A), at
611-42.2 (explaining that under Rule 611, a district court balances “the factors of
prejudice, confusion, and delay against the probative value of the testimony” in
deciding whether to limit cross examination).
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proposed limitation fits the pattern of Old Chief v. United
States,76 where the Court held that in a prosecution for being a
felon in possession of a gun, a prosecutor was not entitled to
admit details of a prior felony if the accused would stipulate to
his status as a felon. Although Old Chief arose in the context of
proving a status, it is similar in posture to the Rule 609(a)(2)
scenario where the proof of a fact is collateral to the underlying
accusation and presents the danger of inviting the jury to make
an impermissible propensity inference. Old Chief can operate
by analogy only because, of course, it was a Rule 403 case.
Nevertheless, its focus on the process of proving an admissible
fact for a collateral purpose is instructive.
CONCLUSION
My sensible proposal is that all evidence must be
screened for unfair prejudice, and where the unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of such evidence,
the trial court must, out of fairness for the accused and respect
for the trial court, possess the discretion to disallow it. This
principle applies even to impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2) for
felonies of dishonesty and false statement. I do not propose any
special, more favorable tests for the accused (as appears in
Rule 609(a)(1)), but argue that a basic Rule 403 balance, which
tends to admit all but the most unfairly prejudicial evidence, is
absolutely fundamental to due process. Indeed, in other
contexts, it has been heralded as the guarantor of due process.
Although courts will doubtlessly conclude that most convictions
regarding dishonesty and false statement are highly probative
and do pass the balancing test of Rule 403,77 there are clearly
some cases where such a test cannot be passed, especially
where the accused is the witness. In such cases, the fairness of
the trial is put in question without a Rule 403 balance.
Given that there is currently no balancing, and hence no
point in making a motion in limine to exclude evidence of
convictions for dishonesty or false statement, it is impossible to
know how many of the accused forgo their right to take the
stand in their own defense. This discouragement from taking
the stand is seriously troubling because the accused could
76

529 U.S. 172, 201 (1997).
See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tuttle, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]onvictions involving dishonesty could be excluded only upon a strong
showing of overwhelming prejudice to the defendant.”).
77
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present useful information and juries tend to be more
conviction-prone if the accused does not testify.
Finally, why did I choose this sensible idea to honor
Margaret Berger? Professor Berger is justly famous for her
work on scientific evidence and expert testimony, but has not
written extensively on character evidence. However, in her
immensely important treatise and her various Science for
Judges articles Professor Berger, undoubtedly influenced by
the model of her teacher and collaborator, Judge Jack
Weinstein, evinces faith in the trial judge and the importance
of the judicial “gatekeeper” role. The tenor of Professor Berger’s
remarkable career reflects a genuine trust in the capacity and
good sense of trial judges, and she has invested her time and
talent into educating them. Where judges are wrong-headed,
Professor Berger has never shied away from challenging
mistaken rulings. In her writings on evidentiary error, the
confrontation clause, and expert testimony, Professor Berger
also has championed the rights of the accused. Even though I
am challenging a statement in her own treatise,78 what better
way to honor her than to propose a reinterpretation of a rule
that restores discretion to judges to preserve fairness for
criminal defendants?

78

2 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 403.02[01][a], at 403-6
(“The one instance in which Rule 403 does not apply is in ruling on the admissibility of
convictions pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2).”).

